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ARGUMENT
"You know, I still don 't know how it would have happened; so it's
kind of difficult, it being how would you make clear that the jury
wasn't going to find a 30-acre parcel, you know?"

Hon. Chas. Hosack- Tr. 8/29/12 at p. 47.

I.

THE TRIAL COURTS TREATMENT OF THE LARGER PARCEL WAS IN
ERROR.
Determining the larger parcel is a factual inquiry, but it must nevertheless be made in

adherence to the law. In its treatment of the larger parcel question, the Trial Court erred, ruling
that the larger parcel conclusion by Grathol' s valuation witnesses was unsupportable and
"contrary to Idaho law." This legal error tainted the Trial Court's consideration of the evidence
at trial and ultimately led to erroneous and unsupported conclusions of fact. The errors in law,
like a pebble tumbling downhill, led to an avalanche of erroneous factual finding - all flowing
from the Trial Court's premise that the larger parcel must encompass the entirety of Grathol's
property. The prejudicial effect of this false premise, combined with evidence offered at trial by
ITD, did not serve to rebut severance ("consequential) damages to the remaining property, as in
the chief purpose of the larger parcel inquiry; but instead was used by ITD to achieve a value of
the take area based on impermissible averaging of excess and unaffected ground.
Grathol' s theory of the case, and all of its evidence at trial, was that the highest and best
use of its property would not involve a singular, cohesive development. While the property will
eventually be put to commercial uses (plural), those uses are not integrated or dependent upon
one another.

Therefore, valuing the property as a single unit was, and is, inappropriate.

1

Grathol's witnesses treated the property as though divided to the east and west of the proposed
Sylvan Road "corridor" which it clearly will be in the foreseeable future. The property to the
east of Sylvan Road was entirely un-impacted by the take and thus no severance damages
alleged.
The western 30 acres of property, however, represents an "independent economic unit"
which can, and will, be developed and utilized as prime commercial property fronting on, and
visible from, two adjacent highways. The western 30 acres form an economic unit based on
location at the lighted intersection of two busy highways, its suitability and optimal size for
development, and its visibility from the adjacent roads. From those 30 acres, ITD's take of
16.314 acres damaged the western economic unit.

That is, both the take itself and the

construction ofITD's proposed improvements caused damage to that western 30 acres - but did
not damage the easternmost portion of the greater property. The western 30 acres suffered
considerable harm (beyond the mere reduction in size) through the impacts of the taking (i.e. the elevated highway design, the loss of the signalized intersection, the increased "pass-by"
speed of the traveling public and the eventual "re-split" of the property for the Sylvan frontage
road). Further, the new highway alignment separates a 3.87 acre portion of the west 30 from the
rest of the property, significantly increasing the cost to extend utilities to that (western)
remainder. In fact, the cost of extending wet and dry utilities under the new highway made the
west 3.87 acres all but unusable.

All of these impacts constitute compensable severance

damages.

2

ITD argued that the entire 57 acres had to be treated as the larger parcel.

ITD's

appraisers opined a per-acre value for the entire property and then simply apportioned that value,
pro-rata to the 16.314 acres taken. ITD did not recognize any differences in value for any
portions of the entire 57 acre tract of land, claiming instead that every square foot of Grathol's
ground was worth exactly the same amount regardless of its location. Contrary to its arguments
on appeal, however, ITD presented no evidence at trial that the use(s) of the western and eastern
portions of the property would be integrated, or that the value of the western portion was
dependent in any manner upon the use of the eastern portion. ITD elected not to cross-examine
Grathol's engineer Jim Coleman when he testified that the sewer infrastructure designed for the
property would be located entirely on the western 30 acres and integrated into the development.
ITD also chose not to present any evidence to support its notion that an integrated use of all 57
acres was essential. The Trial Court acknowledged ITD's failure to present evidence of this
issue, yet it inexplicably disregarded Grathol' s evidence on the same issue. R. at p. 12 74.
ITD's valuation simply averaged in the excess, distant and (logically) less valuable part
of the Grathol property against the undoubtedly higher value of the take area immediately
adjacent to the highway. ITD argued that its valuation method was the only accepted method
and managed to somehow convince the Trial Court that Grathol's larger parcel theory was
"barred" by law. However, Idaho law has never restricted a property owner's right to present its
valuation evidence and other jurisdictions have soundly rejected the Trial Court's "one-size fits
all" valuation approach. Because the Trial Court refused to even consider the evidence, stating

3

that it would not have allowed a jury to consider Grathol's 30 acre "larger parcel," it committed
reversible error, leading to an unsupported determination of just compensation.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN RULING THAT
GRATHOL'S APPROACH TO THE LARGER PARCEL WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The larger parcel is a legal construct employed in (partial) condemnation cases to
determine what the greater area is from which a taking occurs. It is not a unique concept and its
use and utility has been recognized in Idaho as well as virtually all other jurisdictions. See e.g.,

State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963); see also, State Through
Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604 (Ct.App. LA 1966); Territ01y by Sharpless v.
Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.29 979 (1961); State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369
(1997); City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2 (2001); Department of Transportation v.

HP/Meachum Land, 245 Ill.App.3d 252 (1993); State v. Stegmann, 269 So.2d 480 (Ct.App. LA,
1972); Bland v. Bulloch Cnty., 205 Ga.App. 317,422 S.E.2d 223 (1992).
The larger parcel valuation theory was created in part to protect a landowner's right to
receive just compensation where the property taken had no independent utility separate and apart
from a greater portion of land to which it is connected. It is often used in condemnations
involving "strip takes" where, for example, a narrow swath of property is needed to widen a road
but the property taken does not have any discreet, economic value because of its size or shape,
by reason of the lack of market-driven demand for irregularly shaped or narrow parcels which
could not be used independently. In those situations, courts have uniformly held that the fair
market value of such property must be arrived at by considering its use( s) as part of a greater

4

portion of property in order to ascribe some value to it and protect the owner's right to just
compensation for its loss. However, when the property taken is of such size and character so as
to be an independent economic unit and its value can be determined without considering the rest
of the landowner's property, then use of the larger parcel analysis to value the whole property to
arrive at the market value of the take is not appropriate. It is also inappropriate to use an average
per-acre/foot (etc) value of the entire property when the facts show that the property has different
values in different locations. This is exactly what ITD did in this case, despite Idaho's statues
requiring a valuation of the part taken first, then evaluation of severance damages to the part not
taken, if any. See, Idaho Code§ 7-711.
The larger parcel analysis also bears on the determination of severance damages to the
remainder, when the remainder (not taken) has been harmed either by reason of the take or by the
improvements made thereon. In order to recover severance damages, a party must show that the
property taken is a portion of a greater area and that the value and use of the remainder is
dependent upon its use in connection with the part taken. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain

Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972). When no severance damages are sought, the use of
the larger parcel analysis is restricted, and often prohibited, since it can penalize a landowner by
averaging the value of unaffected acreage against the value of the part taken. The reason for this
is simple: larger parcels of land typically sell for lower per unit prices than smaller parcels (and
vice-versa). This is size regression theory. Therefore, strict application of the larger parcel
theory in some situations could be akin to offsetting benefits to the remainder against the value
of the take, which is prohibited by Idaho law.

5

In recognition of these competing influences, the larger parcel analysis must be carefully
tailored to the facts at hand, in order to avoid confusing the separate purposes of the analysis as
the Trial Court did here. One court aptly described the perils of mixing the separate objectives of
the larger parcel analysis. Arizona State Land Dept. v. State, 113 Ariz. 125, 547 P.2d 479
(1976), was an appeal in a partial condemnation action wherein no severance damages were
sought. The condemnee, State Land Department argued that the value of the land taken must be
determined by consideration of a 640 acre "larger parcel" based on a statutory restriction on
maximum size for school trust lands. The State Highway Department convinced the trial court
that the land taken should be proportionally valued in relation to the whole property of which the
take was a part; a ranch consisting of 101,000 acres. Id. at 127, 547 P.2d 481. The Arizona
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence offered by the State
Land Department based on the 640 acre larger parcel treatment. It found that the legal position
of the State Highway Department was incorrect because it confused the valuation of the land
taken with a severance damage analysis. Id. After noting that the take area (109± acres) was not
a separate, stand alone economic unit and necessarily had to be valued as part of a larger tract of
land, the Supreme Court held:
The determination of what constitutes an entire tract m
circumstances where a part taken from that tract has no
independent, economic value should not be confused with the
severance damage concept of the 'larger parcel.' The sole purpose
of the former inquiry is to discover the market value of the parcel
taken from a larger area under the same ownership. A. Jahr, Law of
Eminent Domain s 103, at 139. In contrast, the concern of the
larger parcel principal is with consequential damages to the residue
of the condemned property.
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Id. at 128-29, 547 P.2d 482-83. The Court also observed that once the value of the larger tract of

land was found, a ratio could be employed to compare the part taken with the remaining tract in
order to identify whether the separate portions of land had different value characteristics.
However, that ratio need not be uniform because some portions of land are inherently more
valuable than others. Id. at 129, 547 P.2d 483. 1 Because the trial court limited the evidence of
the take area as being part of a 101,000 acre larger parcel, for which no severance damages were
claimed, the trial court committed reversible error.
The holding and reasoning of Arizona is instructive here. It demonstrates the tangible
risk of effectively penalizing an owner merely for having a large tract of land, a portion of which
will be taken, and a portion of which will be damaged. When a tract has different values and
characteristic; simply averaging the value of the excess and unaffected acreage against the most
valuable part (that is being taken) to determine the market value of the take, can mean the
property owner will not receive just compensation.
In this case, there was no dispute that the eastern part of the Grathol property was

unaffected by the take and no severance damages were sought for it.

1

Just as in Arizona,

Several courts have flatly rejected a uniform approach to valuation. See, Bland v. Bulloch
County, 205 Ga.App. 317, 422 S.E.2d 223 (1992) (error in restricting charge to jury to a pro rata
valuation when value or part taken is not dependent upon the size of the whole); Wilmer v.
Fulton County School District, 226 Ga.App. 884, 487 S.E.2d 709 (Ct.App.1997) (rejecting prorata valuations failing to account for different values of property); Commonwealth v. Hall, 353
S.W.2d 548 (Ky.Ct.App. 1962) (rejecting argument of uniform pro rata valuation); State v.
Moyse, 151 So.2d 149 La.Ct.App. 1963) (finding no objection to dividing property according to
value for valuation as opposed to pro rata method).

7

Grathol's evidence established the "economic unit as a portion of the property less than the
whole, yet greater than the take area. Severance damages were not sought for the excess land to
the east (which coincidentally was the least valuable part of the 57 acres), yet ITD convinced the
Trial Court to utilize a valuation method of averaging the least valuable portion of the 57 acres
against the most valuable portion, in order to arrive at a lower pro-rata value for the part taken.
Just as in Arizona, the Trial Court erred when it refused to consider Grathol's "larger parcel"
and, more importantly in, ruling that such approach is prohibited by law, which it most certainly
is not. Idaho law requires the take to be evaluated first, then to consider severance damages, if
any. ITD and the Trial Court mixed the two considerations.
It is apparent from the Trial Court's conclusions, that the Court erroneously believed the
law to strictly require an analysis of all acreage, whether impacted or not, and whether severance
damages were sought or not.
Grathol's evidence, had it been fairly considered by the Court, was largely unchallenged.
It showed that the 16 acre take was part of a 30 acre independent economic unit of land located

west of the Sylvan Road corridor, and that it derived its value as part of that 30 acre "larger
parcel" without regard for the property to the east of Sylvan. Grathol sought severance damages
only for the remainder of this 30 acre economic unit. Because ITD's take (16.314 acres) was
not, in and of itself, an independent economic unit, the Trial Court had to undertake the larger
parcel analysis by considering contiguity, ownership and prospective integrated uses of the 30

acres. However, at ITD's urging, the Trial Court confabulated the larger parcel analysis, when it
insisted on including additional and unaffected property to the east for which no severance
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damages were sought. The Trial Court incorrectly rejected Grathol's theory as being contrary to
law and utilized the entire property to arrive at a pro-rata value of the take. The Trial Court did
so because it had already decided, in spite of evidence, law and logic that the larger parcel must
be the entire property. This was an error and a profoundly prejudicial error, at that.
The impact of the Trial Court's erroneous legal conclusions cannot be overstated. Judge
Hosack obviously struggled with the larger parcel question from the very beginning.

The

Judge's comments at the pre-trial conference reveal his predisposition:
So, I mean, normally you'd come in here, you have a larger parcel.
That's not a methodology thing by the appraiser. That's a question
that's resolved by the jury. It's a question of fact. And the fact that
Mr. Sherwood likes to divide it up into 30 acres is neither here nor
there.
I understand the reasoning of Mr. Sherwood as an appraiser.
What's that got to do with the legal definition, the factual finding
of what the larger parcel is? Nothing.
How in heaven's name would a competent appraiser appraise a
parcel that's imaginary?

Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. Ip. 66, ll.12-18,pp. 67-68, ll. 20-23,pp. 68-69, ll.18-19.
But the law requires that the parcel that is a contiguous parcel be,
in fact, treated by the fact finder as a contiguous parcel. I would
instruct the jury that the fact that an appraiser has come up with a
development scheme that parses off 30 acres that could be
developed more readily is of absolutely no relevance to their
determination of the larger parcel. In essence I don't see how there
would be any evidence any trier of fact could find the larger parcel
to be anything other than 57 acres.

Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. 1 p. 80, ll. 8-18 (emphasis added). The Trial Court's written Decision shows how
this predisposition manifested itself: "creating a hypothetical parcel within the parent tract to

9

constitute the larger parcel for valuing the part taken (that is where the part taken is only a
portion of the hypothetical parcel) is not recognized in existing case law." R. at p. 1276.
Even after the Decision was issued and this appeal commenced, the Trial Court continued
to editorialize on the question, stating that Grathol's approach was "prohibited" and "directly
contrary to Idaho case law ... " even though it acknowledged that considering the western 30 acre
larger parcel as an economic unit was "very logical and a very good plan." Tr. 8/29/12, p. 42, ll.
5-11.

In this case, the Trial Court's treatment of the larger parcel issue effectively allowed ITD

to capitalize on the size of Grathol's parent tract to arrive at a lower per unit value for the take.
Refusing to give honest consideration of Grathol's larger parcel theory, which the Trial Court
found was logical, credible and supported by the market data, was clear error.2 The Trial Court
simply believed it was required to reject Grathol's approach and thus refused to consider the
evidence at trial.
Other jurisdictions have addressed the mischief of allowing a condemnor to designate a
"parent" tract for the "larger parcel" analysis, noting that averaging of the excess acreage against
the value of the part taken is not permissible when the remaining acreage is unaffected by the
take. In State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366 (1966), the Texas Supreme Court considered the larger
parcel question where the State condemned 14.9 acres of a 103 acre tract. The landowners
waived severance damages and motioned in lirnine to prevent the State from valuing the take

2

R. atp. 1281.

10

based on an average per-acre valuation of the entire 103 acre tract. Id. at 369. The State's
witnesses admitted that if they had appraised the take area as a single tract of land, their appraisal
would have been higher. The trial court granted the motion in limine to ensure landowners
received fair consideration of the land taken. Id. at 369-70. The State chose not to present value
testimony of the condemned land as a whole unit and the jury award reflected the higher value
based on landowners' economic unit theory. The State appealed the trial court's refusal to allow
its witnesses to testify as to value for the take based on the aggregate (average) of the lower
priced remaining acreage. Id. at 374-75.
The Meyer court recognized the pitfalls inherent in the State's approach and declined to
follow any holding which would lead to acceptance of a method that would deprive a landowner
of his property without full constitutional compensation. Id. at 375. The Meyer court recognized
the obvious: that the part taken had a significantly higher per-acre market value than the land not
being condemned which lay further back from the highway. Id. The State argued that after the
take, the remainder would be benefited and might increase in value by reason of the newly
created frontage (i.e. - "slide-back theory"). The Meyer court rejected these arguments, because
such an approach would offset the alleged increased value of the remainder (to which no
severance was sought) against the value of the take. Such off-sets are specifically prohibited. Id.
at 375-76. 3 The Meyer Court held that when damages to the entire remainder are not implicated,
averaging the larger parcel unit value to arrive at the value of the take is inappropriate.

3

Just as they are under Idaho Code § 7-711(3).
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In another Texas case, State v. Windham, 837 S.W.2d 73 (1992), the Court agam

addressed the larger parcel "economic unit" concept.

In Windham, the State condemned

approximately 2 acres consisting of a 110 foot deep strip out of a 19 acre tract for highway
widening. Prior to trial, landowner waived his right to seek damages to the remainder of his
16.88 acres, but designated a larger area (than the 2 acre take) consisting of 3.84 acres
immediately adjacent to the existing highway as the economic unit (larger parcel) for the basis of
the take's value. Id. at 74. The landowner filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence by the
State of the valuation based on a pro rata valuation of the whole property, arguing that the
averaging method would be unconstitutional. The trial court excluded the State's valuation, and
the jury returned a verdict based on valuing the take area as a portion of a 3. 84 acre larger parcel
not a 19 acre larger parcel.
On appeal, the Windham Court recognized that when a severed parcel can be considered
an independent economic unit, its market value can be determined without reference to a
remainder. However, when the portion of the land taken could not be considered an independent
economic unit reflecting the highest and best use of land, the market value must necessarily be
determined by considering some portion or all of the remainder in order to comprise an
economic unit. Id. at 76. When the highest and best use is disputed, it was for the jury to decide
which use is appropriate and what evidence of valuation is correct for the market value of the
take. Id.

The Windham court ruled that the jury was to consider all the uses to which the

property "is reasonably adaptable and for which it is, or in all reasonable probability will
become, available within the foreseeable future." Id. at 77.
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If Windham is permitted to present evidence of the market value of
the part taken utilizing a larger tract than that sought by the
condemning authority based on its theory of highest and best use
of the property, then the State should be allowed to present
evidence based on its competing theory of the higher and best use
for the property.

Id.

The Windham court recognized that a prior case ruled that the condemnee retained the

absolute right to designate the appropriate economic unit when not seeking damages to nonaffected remainder. Id., (discussing, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d
466 (Tex.Civ.App.1976)). However the Windham Court found that the trial judge erred in
precluding the State's method of valuation, ruling that the landowner alone could not define the
suitable economic unit when the uses were in dispute. 4 Windham and Meyer are not unique to
Texas law or otherwise isolated anomalies.
A similar result was reached in City of Westminster v. Jefferson Center Associates, 958
P.2d 495, 1997 WL 671951 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997).

In Westminster, the City condemned an

easement across four parcels of property for a pipeline. The parcels were vacant, undeveloped
and un-platted land, zoned for industrial and commercial uses. They were being held for future
development but used for grazing livestock. Id. at 497. The City's expert valued the easement on
a per acre basis as part of the whole parcel. Id. Landowner's appraiser valued the per acre value
of the easement based upon only the portion of the parcel in which the easement was located. Id.
Landowner's expert opined that the portion of the parcels through which the easement actually

4This

result was upheld in In re: State, 355 S.W.3d 611. 54 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 1754 (2011), holding
that the State does not have the power to constrain the owner's evidence of competing
conceptions of the economic unit by which the take should be valued.
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ran was worth substantially more than the balance of the parcels, primarily because that portion
was immediately adjacent to a highway and would be developed earlier and at less cost than the
rest of the property. The commissioners adopted the opinions of the City's expert and the
landowner appealed, arguing that the City's appraiser did not use a correct valuation method.
On appeal, the Westminster court recognized two approaches to a partial takings
appraisal. The first method included the value of the take plus the difference in the remainder
before versus after the taking. The second method involves comparing the value of the entire
tract before the taking against the value of the remaining tract after the taking. Id. at 500. The

Westminster court recognized that Colorado law mandated the use of the first method for
highway right-of-way purposes because the rule requiring that the portion taken was to be valued
as a part of a parcel was to protect the landowner. Id. at 501, citing, Department of

Transportation v. HPIA1eachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 Ill.App.3d 252, 614 N.E.2d 485
(1993). The Westminster court noted that the City's "averaging" approach did not separately
account for a drainage area which affected the value of the take. Id. at 502. However, the court
held that it was not error to consider the City's approach "so long as the parcel is sufficiently
uniform and that method of valuation is not detrimental to the owner because it does not
accurately value the property actually taken at its highest and best use." Id. (emphasis added).
The determination of whether the parcel is sufficiently uniform to
be amenable to having a portion of it so valued, and whether such a
valuation method is detrimental to the owner by not valuing the
portion taken at its highest and best use, are questions of fact for
the fact finder. Therefore, we hold that evidence of the value of the
part taken as a part of the whole is admissible along with other
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evidence and should be accorded so much weight as it deserves by
the fact -finder.

Id. The take-away of this holding is that the trial courts must permit both parties to present their
arguments as to the value, and it is error to preclude one party's approach when the facts and
evidence support it.
Numerous jurisdictions have allowed landowners to present their theory of a less-thanthe-whole parent tract being the "larger parcel." See e.g., Dade County v. Mindic Realty, Inc.,
551 So.2d 499 (Dist.Ct.App. Florida 1989); Wilmer v. Fulton County School Dist., 226 Ga.App.
884,487 S.E.2d 709 (Ct.App. Georgia 1997); US v. Easements upon 104.09 Acres, 442 F.Supp.
926 (Dist.Ct. Wash. 1977); Merrill Trust Company v. State, 417 A.2d 435 (Maine 1980); State v.

Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 457 A.2d 463 (1983); Division of Administration v. Jirik, 471 So.2d 549
(Dist.Ct.App. Florida 1985); State v. Moyse, 151 So.2d 149 (Ct.App. Louisiana 1963); Babinec

v. State, 512 P.2d 563 (Alaska 1973); People v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604 (1965); Tuscon
Title Ins. Co. v. State, 15 Ariz.App. 452, 489 P.2d 299 (1971); Department of Transportation v.
HP/Meachum, 245 Ill.App.3d 252, 614 N.E.2d 484 (1993); Spiegelberg v. State, 291 Wis.2d
601, 717 N.W.2d 641 (2006).
These cases all inform on how other jurisdictions have properly resolved the competing
evidentiary theories at issue. While here, the Trial Court was convinced that the law flatly
precluded a landowner from valuing the take based on a portion of the entire property; it is clear
from these cases that this methodology is proper in appropriate circumstances. Further, these
cases all illustrate why a trial court should not limit the ability of a landowner to present its
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theory of just compensation. These cases show that when there are no claims to severance
damages to the remainder (or portions of the remainder), it is reasonable, appropriate and indeed
mandated that the valuation be based on the economic unit actually impacted by the take. The
law of eminent domain is, at its essence, the law of what is fair to the property owner.
Based on the reasoning of these cases, it was not proper to refuse consideration of
Grathol's valuation theory. Grathol presented evidence that the western 30 (of its 57) acres
would be put to entirely different types of commercial use when developed, separate from the
property to the east of the Sylvan corridor. Conversely, ITD argued (without evidence) that the
highest/best use of the entire property was to be held for speculative future investment purposes.
It was myopic error for the Trial Court to rule that Grathol's valuation based on the 30 acre
larger parcel was unsustainable in law. Tr. 8/29/13, p. 40, ll. 7-11.

If a landowner is not

permitted to unilaterally designate the larger parcel from which a take occurs (if severance is
actually claimed for such portion), then the condemning authority ought not to have the ability to
mandate what the larger parcel is simply to achieve a lower unit value for the part taken.
Nichols on Eminent Domain speaks directly to this point:

In assessing the value of the land taken as part of the entire tract, it
is not proper merely to compute the percentage value on the
basis of an artificial unit value for the entire tract, unless the
actualities of the case accord with such an approach. It may be
that the part taken is the most valuable part of the tract,
considered from a qualitative point of view. To attribute an
average unit value thereto which is based in part on the lower
value of the balance of the tract is inequitable to the owner in a
double aspect. It attributes a value to the part taken which is
lower than its actual value, and its attributes a higher ultimate
value to the remainder area than its actual value, thereby
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reducing his recovery as to both factors below his actual
damages.

4 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain§ 14.06, p. 144-146 (Revised 3d ed.) (emphasis added).
See also, Bland v. Bulloch Cnty., 205 Ga. App. 317,320,422 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1992) (finding

"no authority" for the proposition that the value of land taken is a pro rata value of the whole
from which it is taken).
In evaluating the larger parcel, courts are bound to consider the unique facts of each
case. Contrary to ITD's arguments and the Trial Court's ruling, there is no universal "one-size
fits all" determination of the larger parcel and Idaho law does not limit a fact finder's
consideration of the evidence. By believing that this theory was "contrary to Idaho case law" the
Trial Court shackled itself to an erroneous and unfair analysis. The Court flatly rejected the
sound legal justification presented and eschewed the very concept that a larger parcel could be
something less than the whole parent tract. 5

In what could only be described as a stream-of-consciousness, the Trial Court judge at one
point offered this monologue: "Well there are great intellectual analyses out there and in this day
of entrepreneurs and technocrats and so on and so forth there is not limit. However, for the law,
there are lirnits. And you are going to have the real problems with your 30-acre guy, because,
sure, that's a fine appraisal and you can go to Google and talk with your friends on Facebook and
it all makes good sense, and everybody-you know, your Starbucks and everything is going fine.
But it doesn't change what the law is which is that you have to work with the 57-acre parcel.
Sure, there is a lot of logic to it. I understand. You can draw castles in the air from here until the
cows come home. When you value the remainder you look at the remainder what it is before and
after the take. The remainder is the remainder. The remainder is the 41 acres. The remainder is
not the 57 acres what you would have done. What was the 41 acres worth before the take and
what was it worth after the take. It was not what was the 41 acres worth that was still part of the
57 acres. That's not the way it works. I understand the intellectual gamesmanship that allows you
to do that, but it is not legally acceptable." Tr. 2/2/2011, Vol. II Pp. 14-16, ll. 23-25, 1-19
(emphasis added).

5
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To determine the larger parcel, the trier-of-fact must consider: (1) unity of title; (2)
contiguity; and (3) unity of use. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho
574, 468 P.2d 306 (1970). While unity of title and contiguity are important, Idaho courts have
stated that the principal factor in the analysis is the unity of use. Id. at 581, 468 P .2d 313
(emphasis added). Emphasis on unity of use is in accord with most other jurisdictions.
The larger parcel analysis is a flexible concept to be applied based on the facts in
consideration of the use, appearance of land, legal divisions (if any) and upon the intent of the
owner. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972). In
}.fountain Home, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that whether two pieces of land constitute

a single (larger) parcel is a practical one for the jury to consider in light of these factors. Id. at
532, 493 P.2d 391. Even though the properties were divided by a barrier (a ditch of considerable
size), it was the prospective integrated use(s) of the property which controlled. The Mountain
Home court noted that it is not the identity of uses of the condemned and remaining land which is

determinative, rather the focus was on the dependency of the value of the remaining land upon
its use in conjunction with the condemned land. Id. The evidence showed that the value of the
remainder (for which severance damages were sought) was dependent upon the part condemned
when the property was put to a prospective (future) highest/best use. Therefore, the Mountain
Home court found that the jury's identification of the larger parcel of more than just the take area
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supported a severance damage award. 6 See, also State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel,
Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306 (1970) (which disregarded separation oflands [contiguity] and

separate ownership interests in properties [unity of title] and focused instead on the unity of use).
Admittedly, there is limited Idaho case law on the larger parcel question, but those cases
that have addressed it recognize that unity of use is the controlling factor. Unity of use is
necessarily the primary focus when dealing with bare, undeveloped land, as the analysis
necessarily requires a prospective, forward thinking evaluation of the highest and best uses to
which the properties can/may/will be put. Even ITD's valuation expert, Stanley Moe recognized
that the prospective uses of the property controlled, when he testified that the present use of the
property is irrelevant to determining the larger parcel because it is vacant and there is no "use" to
consider. Tr. Vol. II, p. 317, ll. 11-15, p. 344, ll. 12-19.
Indeed the Trial Court also recognized that under its (flawed) larger parcel treatment,
unity of use took priority. R. at pp. 1278-1281. However, despite its recognition of the import of
use, the Trial Court virtually ignored uncontroverted evidence and testimony on this point. The
Trial Court specifically held there was little, if any, evidence demonstrating unity of uses
between the eastern and western portions, but then bizarrely ruled that the unity of use "test" was
met because the evidence indicated historical use of the entire property as bare ground. The Trial
6

It must be noted that the issues in Mountain Home were concerned with severance damages
accruing to the remainder not taken. The Mountain Home court did not examine the value of the
take area in the larger parcel analysis. Instead, the case dealt with the logical inverse of the
situation at bar. In Mountain Home, the larger parcel included property that had no contiguity
with the parcel from which the "take" was removed, because the highest, best future use (a golf
course expansion) would mean the uses of the non-contiguous parcels would be unified.
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Court did this because it simply rejected any evidence offered based on its view that Grathol's
valuation theory was contrary to law:
One of the big questions that I would have would be, if we were
dealing with this case going to a jury, where we have
determinations as to this hypothetical larger parcel based upon a
division, just a -- just a division of the property based upon a
speculative project that a particular individual has in mind, would
that even go to the jury? In other words, as a matter of law, does
the finder of fact have any evidence to support a larger 30? I
understand the arguments, and I don't have any problem with
the arguments, and I understand the psychology of the
developer, and it's all correct and valid and meritorious except
in an eminent domain proceeding.

Tr. Vol. V, pp. 1007-1008, ll. 16-25, 1-4 (emphasis added).
I understand the arguments, but at this point you really need a case,
because I think you're asking --- to be honest with you, I think
you're asking the Court to do something that is flat
impermissible under Idaho law and is clearly reversible . ...
Essentially, what I need is some legal authority from the defendant
to buy their theory. I don't have - let me just say it that way. I
don't believe I have any legal case law or any legal rationale or
any legal support for following your theory. So I'm not saying I
don't understand your theory. I'm not understanding --- I'm not
saying there isn't merit to it. I'm saying this is an eminent
domain proceeding and I just can't get there.

Tr. Vol. V, pp. 1011-1012, ll. 2-6, 18-25, 1-2 (emphasis added). Clearly the Trial Court believed
that Idaho law precluded consideration of Grathol's larger parcel theory.

The Trial Court

appears to recognize the merit and logic to Grathol's valuation methodology, but then rejects it
because the property is being condemned. The Trial Court treats the Grathol property differently
than the market would because of condemnation. The Trial Court's treatment of the Grathol
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property is as if it now possessed less rights or value than other property, simply because it was
under threat of condemnation. This prejudicial treatment is unsupportable. Idaho, like other
jurisdictions, has never constrained the condemnee landowner to present valuation evidence
based on a single approach and the Trial Court committed clear error in its approach to valuation
of the take.
B.

THE TRIAL COURTS FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE LARGER
PARCEL ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

At trial, the State and the property owner presented opposing views of how to calculate
just compensation. Grathol's theory was that the western 30 acres from which the take occurred
was an independent economic unit and that the highest and best use of that property was
commercial/retail uses. That property had different values because of its location at the lighted
intersection of the adjoining highways. Grathol considered the remaining 26.4 acres to the east
as essentially surplus, and while the eventual uses of that property might also be commercial
development of some kind, that use was not dependent upon the western 30 acres. ITD argued
that the entire 56.8 acres must be viewed as a single unit and the highest and best use of the
entire property is to hold for future development. 7 Neither party argued that the 26.4 acre eastern
property suffered severance damages or was impacted, in any material respect, by the take and

The definition and purpose behind the highest and best use analysis is to compensate
landowners not just for the loss of property value today, but also for the loss of value to which a
taken property could legally be put in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is logically flawed to
say that the highest and best use of undeveloped commercial property is to remain undeveloped
in anticipation of some future development. It is circular.
7
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construction of ITD's improvements. Similarly, neither party argued that the value of the part
taken was dependent upon the use of the eastern 20 acres.
The Trial Court distinguished City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001)
cited by Grathol, noting that (while not controlling) in Wilson the landowner presented evidence
of a probable zone change for the area of the take, giving it a different highest and best use than
the rest of the parent tract. Here, the Trial Court said the highest and best use of the entire
Grathol property was commercial/retail development. However, the Trial Court stopped short of
finding an actual integration of such uses. Further, the Trial Court reasoned (without evidence)
that Grathol's appraiser (Sherwood) created the 30 acre larger parcel based solely on value. In
reaching this belief, the Court simply ignored Sherwood's testimony that the 30 acre parcel was
dictated by market demand for commercial developments of the type contemplated by Grathol.
For this reason, Sherwood said that the remaining property to the east was excess, and
unaffected. The Trial Court's dismissive treatment of Sherwood's testimony as "irrelevant" was
based on its own preconceived notion of the impossibility of a 30 acre larger parcel. The Trial
Court also erred in its factual treatment of the Wilson case, since the highest and best use of the
entire Grathol property was not a single integrated commercial development, but instead, just as
with the property in Wilson, the prospective uses of the property presented were separate and
independent uses and the underlying land held demonstratively different values based on their
size, location, utility and proximity to adjacent roads.
There was no dispute that the eastern 26 acres of the parent tract was unaffected by the
take. Sherwood testified that the remainder to the east of the Sylvan extension was surplus and
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excluded it entirely from his analysis. Alan Johnson testified that the value of the eastern portion
remained the same both before and after the take, at $1.00 per square foot, suffering no
severance. Tr. 3/8/12, p. 785, II. 4-5, pp. 804-05, ll. 23-25, 1-5.

There was no evidence or

argument by ITD that the eastern portion was impacted in any manner whatsoever. However,
when valuing the area of the take, ITD happily included the entire 56.4 acre tract as the basis for
its pro rata (averaging) valuation.
There were differences in the opinions of the parties as to what the larger parcel was, and
there were considerable differences in opinion of the highest and best use of the property.
Grathol demonstrated that the highest and best use of the 30 acre western larger parcel was for
commercial development and showed what that commercial development might look like.
Sherwood testified that the 30 acre "economic unit" was worth $2.25 per square foot based on
comparable property sales. Johnson testified that the 30 acres could be separated into value
ranges based on the utility and proximity to U.S. 95.
In opposition, ITD offered evidence that the entire property had a single uniform value
throughout, but ITD's witnesses conceded that larger parcels sell for less than smaller parcels
and using a larger property as the basis for value resulted in lowering the values for the take area.
ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe recognized the impact of size on value when examining comparable
properties: "I didn't want to go under 10 acres ... Because there's a relationship between size
and price. As you increase the size of a property, the general relation is that the price per square
foot ... declines." Tr. Vol. I, p. 189, ll. 15-21. When questioned by ITD's counsel on the
impacts of valuation if you don't correctly identify the larger parcel, Moe quickly acknowledged
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that: "It would be appraising property that - it would be misleading on the value." Tr. Vol. L p.

145, ll. 13-15.
Moe, however, acknowledged that a large tract of land would have greater value on the
portions located on a highway than those portions on the rear. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 322-327. He also
admitted that it is reasonable to assume that an equal sized property on the back end has a lower
unit value than the front. Id. In doing so, ITD's own valuation witness admitted that the western
30 acres possessed different values than the remainder to the east. However, Moe made no
distinction between the front and rear of the Grathol property for his valuation. Id. at p. 326, 11.
17-21. Instead, Moe presented a uniform value simply because he treated the larger parcel as 57
acres for his analysis. Id. at pp. 326-27, 11. 22-25, 1-2.
The fallacy of the Trial Court's approach to valuation of the take based on size regression
is easily illustrated. Consider the impact of using larger or smaller comparables against a take
area. The actual take in this case was 16.314 acres. That quantity of property has a value
whether or not it is attached to any other property. That value is first determined without regard
to severance, which under Idaho law requires a separate analysis. The just compensation for the
16.314 acres taken cannot be reduced by considering its use in connection with other property. If
the 16.314 acre take area were a stand-alone parcel, the just compensation due would be simply
based on what a comparable 16.314 acre parcel, located on the intersection of two highways,
would sell for on the open market. The comparables for determining this would not be based on
the average price per acre for 57 acre tracts of land. If the value of that 16.314 acre piece is or
approaches such size and utility to constitute an independent economic unit, its value can, and
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should, be determined without respect to the remainder. If that value, as an independent parcel,
is greater than the average per acre value when combined with other property, then the use of the
averaging method unconstitutionally reduces the just compensation (for the take) to which the
landowner is entitled. If the evidence shows that the value of the take area is $1.00 per square
foot as a separate economic unit, and the ultimate award of just compensation for that take area is
based on a $.50 square foot average (because larger tracts sell for less), then that owner has been
deprived of just compensation by an impermissible and artificial reduction. This is exactly how
the Trial Court treated the Grathol property.
This line of thinking is endemic throughout ITD's theory of the case. In testifying on the
value after the take, Moe testified that the remainder property had about the same square foot
value as before the take. However, he also stated that: "So, if anything, the -- just based on the
size differences, you would have a slight increase in the unit value." Tr. Vol. II, p. 268, ll. 14-20.

By this logic, ITD is advocating a position that the landowner is benefitted by reducing the
size of his property, thus leading to smaller more valuable acreage afterwards. In other
words, "since smaller parcels are worth more per acre, and we have reduced your property size,
we have actually increased the value of the remainder,just by virtue of taking some of it."
This issue becomes less abstract if one considers carefully the manner in which the
property is used, since the use will inform on whether all or just part of the property is impacted
by the take. To answer the unity of use question in the larger parcel analysis, the Trial Court had
to consider whether there was a prospective unity of use (i.e. - that the highest and best use of the
land was necessarily integrated) in order to constitute a single larger tract. However, the Trial
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Court erred speetacularly on this point. Indeed, the Trial Court's penultimate legal conclusion
(that the larger parcel encompassed the entire Grathol property) is even unsupported by its own
factual findings:
At trial, ITD argued that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres
for its commercial/retail development; however, this Court
finds that there is insufficient evidence, if any evidence at all, in
support of ITD's argument. Grathol's expert witness and
appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood ("Sherwood") testified
repeatedly that he used 30 acres because he could not find any
instances where a commercial/retail development, that was
comparable to the type of project he believed to be appropriate for
the property, had needed more than 30 acres ....

Furthermore, Grathol put in evidence that wastewater for its
proposed project could be disposed of on-site in a number of
different ways.
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol's
proposed project required the easterly 26 acres in order to
dispose of waste, because Grathol's theory for the larger parcel
for this case was that it would not need more than the 30 acres
to develop its commercial/retail project.
R., at p. 1274 (emphasis added).

The Trial Court held that ITD failed to present any evidence in support of its "unity of
use" concept for the larger parcel determination. ITD did not introduce any evidence of a
prospective, integrated use; ITD did not present witness testimony regarding future use; and ITD
did not even cross-examine Grathol's engineer Jim Coleman, who testified that the wastewater
treatment systems could be located entirely on the western 30 acres and integrated into its
development.

26

In its Brief on Appeal, ITD repeatedly cites to a Report of David Evans and Associates
("DEA") as factual support for its argument that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres to develop
its property; however, that Report was not admitted at trial. Moreover, ITD did not call any
witnesses from DEA to testify about acreage needed for development. ITD attempts to correct
for this by citing to materials attached to an earlier Affidavit in Support of a Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. at p. 510. ITD's reliance on materials not admitted in evidence at trial is
improper. Indeed, it appears ITD had, at one point, intended to present such evidence at trial, but
then chose not to do so. R. at pp. 1-8. 8 ITD cannot now, on appeal, attempt to bootstrap its
arguments by citing to a report not in evidence, and which the Trial Court never considered. At
trial, the fact finder is only to consider evidence admitted at trial, consisting of testimony of
witnesses and exhibits admitted into evidence. See, IDTI 1.00. Because ITD chose not to cross
examine Coleman on his testimony, did not call witnesses to testify as to the integration of uses
for the property and did not rebut Grathol' s evidence on these issues; it cannot now try to rely on
materials not admitted in evidence to rebut Grathol' s proof. Indeed, the Trial Court's own ruling
recognized the absence of such evidence and rejected ITD's argument of integrated use.
There is no support for ITD's premise that the entire property was an integrated unit for
purposes of valuing the take. Strangely, the Trial Court called Sherwood's 30 acre larger parcel

8

The tactical decision to not call any witnesses at trial from David Evans and Associates was not
an oversight. ITD's reasoning for this is clear, as more fully explained in the section titled
"Severance Damages" infra, where another of ITD's witnesses, George Hedley did testify, but
established that through his work with DEA, they determined that the cost of developing the
Grathol property increased significantly as a result of this partial taking. In other words, proving
(through a different valuation method) the very severance damages that Grathol argued for.
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designation both "logical and credible" (R., at p. 1281), and stated that Sherwood's justification
(for the 30 acre larger parcel) was "very logical and probably a very, very good plan." Tr.
8/29/12, p. 42, ll. 2-6. However, despite such express findings, the Trial Court stuck with the 57

acre larger parcel solely because of its belief that Grathol' s theory was "contrary to the law."
There's no question that Sherwood's characterization of the
west 30 acres and Grathol's plans for the west 30 acres was not
screwball. I mean, it was very logical and probably a very, very
good plan. But it would the idea would be that a landowner
could come in and say, 'I have this plan, and, therefore it's the
highest and best use for this particular position.' And I think
that's directly contrary to Idaho case law, among other things.
Id. at p. 42,

fl.

3-11 (emphasis added).

Based on the un-contradicted evidence that the property would not be integrated, one is
hard pressed to understand how the Trial Court could simultaneously reject the suggestion that
Grathol needed less than the entire property for its intended use, and then accept ITD's larger
parcel argument. From the Trial Court's findings, it is evident that the Court simply disregarded
unchallenged evidence at trial in its steadfast opposition to Grathol's theory.

Rather than

considering the prospective integrated commercial uses, of which much evidence was offered,
the Trial Court retreated to only considering the historical use of the property as undeveloped
land, noting that the land was uniformly zoned. R. at pp. 16-17. In doing so, the Trial Court
ignored the intent of the landowners as to the prospective uses of the property. The Trial Court's
ultimate conclusion as to the larger parcel is unsupported by the facts.
The cases cited herein hold that the burden of proof is on the party asserting the
integration (or separation) of properties, in order to support their argument of the larger parcel.
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These cases state that while there is a presumption that adjoining lands held by a single
landovmer are a single larger parcel, it is a rebuttable presumption. Once that presumption is
overcome, the burden is on the opposing party to introduce evidence to support their theory.
Here, Grathol had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the properties were to be put to
separate uses. Grathol put on such evidence and testimony, thereby overcoming the presumption
of prospective unity and shifting the burden to ITD to present evidence that the lands would
actually be integrated as a single economic unit for development.

It is also clear from the

Court's findings that ITD failed to present any evidence on this point, so ITD could not have met
its burden. Nevertheless, the Trial Court remai..t-1ed stubbornly opposed to considering Grathol's
larger parcel theory, as it had foreshadowed in pre-trial proceedings:

In essence I don't see how there would be any evidence any trier of
fact could find the larger parcel to be anything other than 57 acres.
Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I, p. 80, ll. 8-18. That evidence was offered, but the Trial Court had preordained its
consideration of the same. In the face of largely unchallenged evidence from Grathol's witnesses,
the Trial Court had already decided that the larger parcel must encompass the whole of the
property.
There's no issue with regard to the larger parcel, as the Court
originally conceived of a larger parcel. Maybe its 56.8 or maybe it's
56.4, but to neither valuation expert did that make a bit of difference
so it's basically, that's the larger parcel.
Tr. Vol. IV., pp. 688-90, ll. 23-25, 1-3. Despite noting that ITD presented no evidence to support
its theory of "unity of use," the Trial Court simply adopted ITD's argument because it ruled
Grathol's theory was barred by law. Once the Court decided that the larger parcel was the entire
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property, it proceeded to disregard the valuation estimates and severance damage evidence from
Grathol because that evidence was also based on the rejected smaller parcel theory, thus the legal
error was exponentially compounded.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF ZERO SEVERANCE DAMAGES
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Contrary to ITD's arguments, Grathol is not asserting "new" claims for severance damages.
Rather, Grathol is appealing the Trial Court's decision of "zero severance damages" as being
unsupported by the clear weight of the evidence, including evidence offered by ITD's own
witnesses. The Trial Court's conclusion on severance damages is difficult to comprehend. For
example, GeoffReeslund testified that the western portion of the Grathol property suffered damages
by reason of ITD's take and the construction of the new highway interchange. Reeslund testified
that the cost of extending utilities to the westernmost portion, which (solely by reason of ITD's
construction) is now physically severed from the eastern portion, will approach $1,000,000, more
than the total value of the 3.87 acres which would be served by those utilities. Prior to the take, the
property was contiguous with no barriers to placing utility infrastructure throughout the property.
After the take, however, the new highway interchange prevented the extension of those utilities.
Because of the interchange, additional costs are required to provide utilities to the west 3.87 acres.
This is not some discrete independent basis for an award of severance damages as ITD
claims, but instead those costs impacted the value of the western remainder after the take.
Reeslund's testimony bolstered Alan Johnson's testimony as to the value of the property before and
after.

The utility costs were factored in as a component of severance damages in Johnson's
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valuation, when he opined that the value of the remainder after the taking and testified that
severance damages were between $338,000 and $798,000. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 813-815. Grathol did
not present a line-item list of costs/severance damages, nor is it required to do so. However, Grathol
was entitled to give evidence of severance damages and Reeslund provided testimony showing how
the property was damaged by reason of the take.

Johnson encapsulated these damages in his

testimony as to the remainder values.
However, the Trial Court either ignored or forgot, or overlooked this testimony, as well as
that of one of ITD' s expert witnesses, when it concluded that there was "no evidence" of severance.
Again, like the :fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree effect, the Trial Court seems to have disregarded
evidence and found Johnson's valuation testimony not credible simply because it was based on
"Johnson's reliance on the larger parcel being 30 acres." R. at p. 1295.
Similar to its treatment (or, more accurately, its non-treatment) of Reeslund's testimony, the
Trial Court likewise did not even address the direct and rm-contradicted testimony of one of ITD's
expert witnesses, George Hedley. This omission is critical, and why on appeal, ITD understandably
seeks to downplay Hedley's testimony. 9
George Hedley was identified by ITD as an expert witness who would opme on the
economic feasibility of developing the Grathol property. Specifically, Hedley was hired to critique
Grathol's development plans and offer testimony on why the plans were not feasible. Quite simply,
he was employed to explain the numbers; and he did. Hedley testified that the development costs

9

Hedley's testimony also explains ITD's decision to forego offering evidence at trial from David
Evans and Associates as more fully discussed at page 28, herein.
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required of Grathol after ITD's take for the remaining property increased by $1.98 per square foot,
when compared to the development costs required of Grathol for the same prospective development
had the take not occurred. ITD now attempts to dismiss this testimony as insignificant:
It is not surprising, or significant for purposes of Grathol 's severance
damage argument that the per square foot value testified to by
Hedley for Grathol's development costs after the Project was greater
than the costs before the Project. The reason for the increased cost
was not because the Project made the development more expensive,
but rather because there was less property belonging to Grathol after
the Project.

rID's Brief at p. 53. That is not what Hedley testified to, but even if it was, that is the~
definition of severance damages. "The damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned." See, Idaho Code
§ 7-711 (2). ITD claims that the increased development costs were caused because there is now less

land available, which is because of ITD's take. It's the quintessential description of severance
damage. However, ITD simply shrugs this off, claiming that Hedley' s testimony cannot be used to
justify an award of severance damages. Which begs the question: Why not? The Idaho and US
Constitutions protect the landowner's right to just compensation for a taking and for injury to his
remaining property regardless of the source of the injury. Further, Hedley's testimony served to
discredit ITD's other valuation witnesses who claimed there were zero severance damages.
However, the Trial Court inexplicably failed to address or even mention Hedley's testimony
which was un-opposed and un-contradicted! To the Trial Court, it's as if such testimony didn't
exist, like the proverbial tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it. The Trial Court committed
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clear, reversible error in ruling there was no evidence of severance damages. Hedley's testimony
proved otherwise, just as did Reeslund' s and Johnson's.
The Trial Court's finding of no severance damage is utterly unsustainable. The Trial Court
either ignored or missed ITD's own offering. Because the Trial Court totally failed to address this
uncontested testimony from ITD demonstrating severance damages, its conclusion was clearly
erroneous and must, in the interest of justice, be reversed.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
GRATHOL'S VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION.

ITD misrepresents the Sylvan Road issue, arguing that Grathol's evidence on the impacts
of Sylvan Road would created a separate, line item of damages. That was not the purpose or
point of the excluded evidence. Grathol understood that ITD was not physically condemning
Sylvan Road (at this time), and that it could not recover damages for a take, because the take had
not (yet) occurred.

The Trial Court ruled at summary judgment that it could not award

compensation for the taking of Sylvan Road because it was not being condemned. However, the
Trial Court simultaneously ruled that the impact to the remainder of the Grathol property, of
having Sylvan Road extend through the property in the future, was "not irrelevant." Tr. 212/12,
Vol. I,pp. 16-17, ll. 18-25, 1-12.
At trial, however, ITD vociferously opposed any testimony about Sylvan Road, claiming
it was precluded because Grathol did not have a "separate and discrete value" for the damages.
Tr. 3/8/12,pp. 801-802, ll. 8-25, 1-22.
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ITD willfully misconstrued the purpose of Johnson's testimony concerrung Sylvan.
Grathol was not offering evidence of the impacts of the Sylvan Road extension in order to make
a separate claim for damages.

Grathol was (trying) to establish that the project related

influences, including the future requirement to extend Sylvan, affected the value of the
remainder.

Evidence of how the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road through the property

impacts the fair market value of the remainder is relevant to damages. The Trial Court had
previously acknowledged this, but at trial, and upon ITD's urging, the Trial Court then limited
and virtually precluded Johnson from testifying how the Sylvan Road dynamic impacted his
opinions on value. All relevant evidence informing on the value of the property is admissible in
a proceeding to determine just compensation. That has always been the law. Grathol conceded
that its claims for severance damages were incorporated into the "before" and "after" valuation
testimony of its witnesses. There was never going to be testimony of a line-item of damages
associated with Sylvan Road. However, the impacts of an eventual Sylvan Road extension go
beyond the mere dirt value of the road corridor or costs of construction. ITD's project made the
extension of a frontage road through Grathol's property, a foregone conclusion. This much was
even recognized by the Trial Court. Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I, p. 16, ll. 3-17.
At trial, Grathol attempted to question Alan Johnson as to how extending Sylvan Road
impacted his valuation opinion.
Q. [Mr. Marfice] Mr. Johnson, if Sylvan Road crosses through the
property ... regardless of how or when it happens, does that impact
your use of the property? That's all I'm asking yes or no.
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Ms. York: Same objection Your Honor. It's not part of this case.
ITD is not alleging it as part of this case, and he doesn't have any
claims for damages as a result of any future construction of Sylvan
Road.
The Court: Well, I'll let it go with just a yes or no, as afar as if the
answers only yes or no. If he adds something else, it's going to get
stricken.

Tr. 3/8112, p. 802, ll. 12-25.

Johnson answered in the affirmative, that the Sylvan Road

extension does impact the use of the property, but no further explanation was allowed.
The Trial Court erred in precluding Johnson frorn explaining how a Sylvan Road corridor
extension impacted the property and how it impacted the property's highest/best use and thus its
value. The Trial Court precluded Johnson frorn providing credible support for his value and
severance damage opinions. In precluding this testimony, the Trial Court had already effectively
decided that Johnson would be testifying to a separate itern of damages which was not the intent
of the questions.

Then, compounding the error, in its Decision, the Trial Court criticized

Johnson's testimony as factually unpersuasive, unexplained and "confusing." R. at pp. 1293,
1294. It should hardly be surprising that the testimony seemed confusing when the Trial Court

refused to hear the foundational basis for the testimony. The Trial Court failed to consider and
appreciate that the Sylvan Road related testimony was being offered to support Johnson's
opinions of value, as previously disclosed. That testimony was both admissible and necessary to
assist the Court in understanding how Grathol's damage calculations were achieved.
The subject testimony was never intended to support a discrete claim for damages for a
Sylvan Road taking. It was offered as support for understanding what the impacts of ITD's
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project on the remainder of the property.

The Trial Court committed reversible error in

preventing Grathol from offering this evidence, and it bound itself to a hopelessly incomplete
body of evidence upon which to decide the valuation question.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AW ARD ING COSTS AND
DISCRETIONARY COSTS TO A CONDEMNOR.

This Court has repeatedly held that Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides the exclusive basis for
awarding attorney's fees in actions involving state entities. This Court has even held that ruling
in this very case. State, Dep't of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 278 P.3d 957 (2012). Tr.
8/29/12, pp. 35-36. The Trial Court reasoned that the Section 12-117 "standard" (acting without

a reasonable basis in fact or law) serves as guidance to applying the Acarrequi 10 standards for
determining the prevailing party.
The Trial Court noted that the main issue in the case was the larger parcel question. Tr.
8/29 at p. 39. The Court then held that, while in its view, Grathol's larger parcel theory was

unsupported because the law "really isn't there," nevertheless, Grathol's theory was "novel and
creative and certainly pushing the envelope." Id. at pp. 40, 45. The Trial Court specifically ruled
that Grathol's efforts weren't unreasonable and that under the criteria of Section 12-117 an
award of fees to ITD under Idaho Code § 7-71 7 was unjustified. Id. at p. 49. The Trial Court,
therefore, found that the remaining analysis under Acarrequi was moot because the condemnor
failed to show the absence of any reasonable basis in fact or law for the condemnee' s actions. Id.

Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. By & Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d
1067 (1983).

10
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However, the Trial Court took a different track with respect to awarding costs, because
costs "seem" to be awarded in condemnation actions under HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 282
P.3d 595 (2012). Id. at p. 50. The Trial Court departed from its consideration of Idaho Code §
12-117 as "guidance" and returned to a "prevailing party" analysis under LR.C.P. 54(d)(l),
without giving consideration to the reasonableness of Grathol's defense. The Trial Court ruled
that ITD was a prevailing party under Acarrequi because the Court's final award of just
compensation was lower than ITD's last communicated offer prior to trial.
The Court erred in its treatment of Acarrequi and Idaho case law as providing support for
an award of costs to a condemnor as a prevailing party in their case-in-chief.
In Acarrequi, this Court examined a trial court's award of attorney's fees under Idaho

Code § 12-121 and costs under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) to a condemnee. Acarrequi created a new
standard governing both attorney's fees and costs only as it relates to a condemnation
proceeding. Id. at 875, 673 P.2d 1069. The Acarrequi Court recognized that Idaho Code § 7718, as interpreted, requires the condemnor to pay all costs. Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1070 (citing,
Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P .2d 722 (1931 ); Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson,

26 Idaho 37, 141 P. 74 (1914)), but held that while fees and costs are allowable under I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l), they are not mandatory to the condemnee in all circumstances. Nothing in Acarrequi
even implies that fees may be awarded to the coµdemnor.
The Acarrequi Court recognized that the prior standard for an award of fees to a
condemnee would have required the condemnee to show that the action was brought by the

condemnor unreasonably or without foundation, and that it would be seldom that a government
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entity could be shovvn to have initiated a condemnation action frivolously. Id. at 876-877, 673
P .2d 1070-1071. Therefore, in order for a condemnee to recover fees, the Acarrequi Court
reasoned that a condernnee's recovery would be based on the condmenor's failure to make a
reasonable offer of settlement in a timely fashion.
As to costs, Acarrequi recognized that F.R.C.P. 54 did not apply to condemnation
proceedings. Since the condemnor is normally the prevailing party, and should not recover its
costs against the property owner, the general rule which provides for costs to the prevailing party
is inapplicable in condemnation proceedings. 11
This Court concluded:
We now hold that an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the
condemnee in an eminent domain action is a matter for the trial
court's guided discretion and, as in other areas of the law, such
award will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse. We
further hold that the condemnee's costs may be awarded under
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) or 54(d).
Id. at 878, 673 P.2d 1072 (emphasis added). Finally, the Acarrequi Court enumerated several

factors to be considered in an award of fees/costs to the condernnee and remanded the trial
court's "automatic" award in light of the new factors, including an analysis of whether the
ultimate award of just compensation was within 90% of the condernnor' s timely pre-trial offer of
settlement.

11

The Acarrequi Court cited to the committee notes to F.R.C.P. 71A, finding that "costs of
condemnation proceedings are not assessable against the condernnee unless by stipulation he
agrees to assume some or all of them." Id. at 877, 873 P.2d 1071, citing 6A Nichols on Eminent
Domain§ 27.6 (3d ed. 1981) (emphasis added).
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The impact of Acarrequi is that this Court crafted a specific standard for an award of fees
and costs to the condemnee. Acarrequi does not, however, stand for the proposition that a
different analysis is utilized when considering fees as opposed to costs. Rather, the award of fees
or costs to the condemnee must be treated the same. "Since we have held that an award of
attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnee in a condemnation proceeding lies within the discretion
of the trial court, it is appropriate that we delineate some factors which the trial court should
consider in exercising that discretion." Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1071 (emphasis added). There is
nothing in Acarrequi to suggest that a bifurcated analysis be utilized to determine an award of
costs separate from an award of fees.
Here, for some inexplicable reason, the Trial Court departed from its recognition ofldaho
Code § 12-117 as a limitation on an award of fees and awarded costs to ITD. The Trial Court
committed legal error when it failed to apply the same standard in considering an award of costs
to the condemnor. In doing so, the Trial Court also significantly departed from the long line of
cases holding that in condemnation proceedings, costs are borne by the condemnor. Bassett v.
Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931); Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho
37, 141 P. 74 (1914).

Those cases have not been abrogated or overruled and are binding

precedent, which the Trial Court simply ignored in awarding costs to ITD. The Trial Court
committed legal error in applying the Acarrequi standards against a condemnee to justify
awarding costs to ITD, and created an entirely new standard. The Acarrequi Court provided no
analysis of the propriety or constitutionality of awarding of costs or attorney's fees to a
condemnor, nor did it elaborate on its " ... we cannot envision an award of attorney's fees and
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costs to a condernnor" dicta. The Trial Court here similarly did not undertake any reasoned
analysis of such an award, and it erred in ignoring binding Idaho precedent to award costs to
ITD.
ITD argues in its Brief that costs have been awarded to condernnors "a number of times"
including two times to ITD itself, citing Grathol I and !TD v. HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,282
P.3d 595 (2012). ITD also cites Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d
1225 (Ct.App. 2001) in support of their argument. ITD presented the same cases to the Trial
Court in support of its argument; however, in these cases, the condemning party was awarded
costs only on appeal. Costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party on appeal
under I.A.R. 40, not I.R.C.P. 54. In none of these cases were costs ever awarded to a condernnor
as a prevailing party in the underlying action. The Trial Court failed to recognize the distinction.
If costs had ever been awarded to the condemning party under Acarrequi or its progeny, or under
Idaho Code § 12-117 or § 7-718; ITD would have seized upon such case and presented it as
support. However, the absence of any such cases, in Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, is telling.
The Trial Court's reliance on these cases for an award of fees under I.R.C.P. 54 is unsupported.
It is instructive to consider the federal treatment of costs and fees in condemnation

proceedings. F.R.C.P. 71.1(1) applies to condemnation proceedings and provides simply that
costs are not subject to F.R.C.P. 54(d). The Committee Notes to subdivision (1) states: "Since
the condemnor will normally be the prevailing party and since he should not recover his costs
against the property owner, F.R.C.P. 54(d) which provides generally that costs shall go to the
prevailing party is made inapplicable." While Idaho does not have a Rule 71.1(1) equivalent, the
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federal rule treatment recognizes that a condemnor would ordinarily be considered a prevailing
party (having successfully condemned the property) and that costs should not be assessed against
a condernnee under F.R.C.P. 54.
The same essential legal error by the Trial Court should also have precluded the award of
$11,000 as discretionary costs to ITD as a prevailing party. However, assuming arguendo that
discretionary costs to a condemnor were permissible, the Trial Court chose to award those costs
simply because Pines' appraisal was helpful.

Being "helpful" evidence doesn't make it

necessary or exceptional under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) standards. The statements by the Trial
Court as to the "helpfulness" of Pines' appraisal do not substitute for the required finding that the
discretionary cost award must be both necessary and exceptional. IR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).

In

rationalizing the award of discretionary costs for the appraisal of Pines, the Trial Court even
noted that part of the reason for the award was based on problems with ITD's own initial
appraisal (by Stanley Moe) which the Trial Court characterized as "low ball". Tr. 8/29/12 at p.
57.
And having the second appraiser come in, who frankly seemed a
little bit more straightforward than either of the other appraisers
and certainly was more comprehensible than Sherwood - was
really very, very helpful to the Court in terms of providing some
basis for what the Court feels is a really credible value.

Id. The Trial Court justified the award of expert fees for Pines basically because his testimony
was more credible than the other appraiser witnesses, including ITD's appraiser. In the absence
of Pines' report, presumably the Trial Court would have had to rely solely on the other valuation
witnesses to arrive at its award. The fact that ITD's own appraiser presented a "low-ball" value
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should not mean that the expense of a second appraisal was either necessary or exceptional, and
should certainly not mean that the expense is attributable to the condernnee. Any "necessity" for
Pines' work was created, at least in part, by ITD's own strategy in presenting a low ball
valuation that was not credible. The only thing exceptional about the need for ITD to employ a
second appraiser to testify was the fact that ITD' s first appraisal was deficient, and awarding the
additional expense against Grathol is unconscionable and unsupported.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
DECLINING TO AWARD ITD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER LC.§ 12-117.

IN

ITD cross-appealed the Trial Court's denial of its request for attorney's fees. ITD sought
fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 7-718 and "Idaho case law governing the award of costs
and fees in condemnation cases." R. at pp. 1316, 1321, 1351. At oral argument on ITD's motion,
ITD clarified that it was not seeking fees under Section 12-121, but rather under the
"particularized rules for costs and attorney's fees that applies to condemnation cases." Tr. 8129 at
p. 5. ITD did not request fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. Grathol objected to ITD's request for

fees based on Idaho cases holding Idaho Code § 12-117 as the "exclusive basis" for an award of
fees in actions involving government entities and ITD's failure to move for fees under Section
12-117, arguing that the court was not empowered to award fees on a basis not asserted by the
moving party. Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999).
Despite objection, the Trial Court treated ITD's fee request under Idaho Code § 12-117.
Appellate review of an award of fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-11 7 is subject to an abuse
of discretion standard. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). On
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appeal, ITD does not present argument that the Trial Court abused its discretion, declining to
award fees.
Instead, ITD continues to argue that Idaho Code § 12-117 does not apply to the instant
condemnation action, despite this Court's express holding in Grathol I, Randel and Potlatch

Educ. Ass'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 184 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010). While this
Court has not expressly defined "exclusive" in the context of these cases, it is difficult to
understand what other meaning "exclusive" has, other than as the "single" or "sole" basis for an
award of attorney's fees to a state entity. Recently, this Court applied Idaho Code § 12-117 to
inverse condemnation actions as well. See, Alpine Vil!. Co. v. City of Mc Call, 39580, 2013 WL
2663852 (Idaho June 14, 2013).
Still, ITD continues to ignore these holdings, arguing that Idaho Code § 7-718 provides a
basis for an award of fees to a condemnor when fees are treated as costs. While it is not disputed
that Idaho cases have allowed attorney's fees as costs to a condemnee under Section 7-718, there
are simply no cases that have allowed a condernnor fees (or costs) under Section 7-718.
ITD relies on a tortured and misguided interpretation of Acarrequi and its progeny,
arguing that these cases establish that a condemnor may be awarded attorney's fees. ITD appears
to recognize that Acarrequi altered the prior analysis of fees and costs to a condemnee, but then
ITD seeks to extend the same factors in reverse for an award of fees to a condemnor. In doing

so, ITD completely ignores the Acarrequi Court's reasoning for tailoring the prevailing party
analysis for a condemnee

in order to avoid the undue hardship of forcing a landowner to

demonstrate that the action was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Id. at
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876-877, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. The Acarrequi Court found that this burden was too great since it
would seldom be the case where a condernnee could demonstrate that the condemnor's actions
were frivolous.
None of the cases relied on by ITD support its argument. None of those cases dealt with
the propriety or constitutionality of a fee award against a landowner. Instead, ITD seizes upon
dicta in Acarrequi. ITD relies on this isolated statement that encompasses the entirety of Idaho's
jurisprudence on the propriety of fees to a condernnor. As noted above, that statement appears in
Acarrequi without any real analysis or context and was made in the course of setting out new

standards for an award of costs and fees to a condernnee. Absent any discussion or analysis, that
statement alone cannot create a right to fees against the condernnor, especially when the
Acarrequi Court recognized that prior case law required costs to be borne bv the condernnor

under Idaho Code§ 7-718 -the very statute ITD seeks fees under.
It has been almost universally recognized that condemnation proceedings are not ordinary

litigation. The landowner finds himself in court through no fault of his own and forced to incur
expenses to recover just compensation for the government's unilateral taking of his/her property.
There is a split of authority as to whether a condernnee's costs and attorney fees should be
considered as constitutionally required "just compensation" when the inevitable result is that
costs and fees will reduce the compensation ultimately received.

Indeed, early Idaho law

mandated the award in order to ensure that the landowner was made whole. However, there are
no cases in Idaho or anywhere else that have held that the condemnor' s costs and fees can be
awarded against a landowner. If that were to occur, the award of a condernnor' s attorney's fees
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would be set-off against the constitutionally protected just compensation and could even result in
the perverse result (here) of the landowner owing money to the condemnor. That would be a
perversion.
The only reported case which Grathol has located dealing with this issue is City of
Westminster v. Hart, 928 P.2d 759 (1966), where the Colorado Court of Appeals soundly

rejected this approach. In Hart, the trial court denied the City's request for costs after the verdict
of just compensation was less than the City's offer of settlement. Id. at 759. The trial court held
that the statute relied upon by the City 12 was inapplicable in condemnation actions. The City
appealed the denial of its claim. On appeal, the Hart court found that it was presumed that when
the General Assembly enacted Colorado's condemnation statutes, it intended compliance with
the State Constitution. The Colorado Constitution, provides Gust as does Idaho's) in Article II §
15, that "private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just
compensation." 13 Id. The Constitution protects an owner's right to full compensation for an
involuntary taking by a governmental agency. Hart states that requiring the owner to pay the
City's costs would violate the owner's rights to just compensation. Id. According to the Hart
court:
To hold otherwise would result in the owners rece1vmg less
compensation than specified by the board of commissioners. Such
a result is prohibited by Colo. Const. art. II, § 15, which
exclusively authorizes a board of commissioners or a jury to
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. Am. § 13-17-202(l)(a)(II) was similar to I.R.C.P. 68 for an offer of judgment.
13 Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefore. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14.

45

determine the amount of just compensation. (Internal citations
omitted)
Therefore, we reject the city's contention that § 13-17202(1)(a)(II) applies to condemnation proceedings in which the
final judgment is less than the amount of the city's offer of
settlement.
Id. Like the City of Westminster, ITD seeks to have Grathol'sjust compensation award reduced

by the amount of its own costs and attorney's fees, which, not coincidentally, exceed the amount
of the award by a 2 to 1 margin. The result would be to completely offset the just compensation
award and end with Grathol owing money back to the State.

That result would be

constitutionally abhorrent.
A condemnation proceeding is an action provided for by the Idaho Constitution, not the

legislature. Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 222, 596 P.2d 75, 94 (1978), affirming State ex rel.

Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 943, 500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972). 14 While the Legislature is
granted the right to establish the procedures for determining just compensation, it does not have
the ability to intrude upon or reduce the constitutionally required just compensation. Since a
condemnee's right to just compensation is protected by Idaho's Constitution, the Legislature
cannot infringe on that right by providing any mechanism that will reduce or even eliminate that

14

An eminent domain proceeding is not an ordinary 'civil' action wherein the factual issues are
submitted to a jury for determination. Historically, eminent domain action was ex parte and
inquisitorial in the common law and has not been regarded as a civil remedy. Nichols on
Eminent Domain, ss 1.1-1.44 (3d rev. ed.). The power of eminent domain arises as an incident to
sovereignty of the state with this authority recognized by the state constitution. Idaho Const. Art.
1, s 14; Portneuf Irrig. Co., Ltd. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046 (1909). The procedures for
eminent domain actions have been established by the legislature. Idaho Code, Title 7, Ch. 7.
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award.

Any interpretation to the contrary would be unconstitutional.

Similarly, the Fifth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. US. Const., amend V

The Fourteenth Amendment

applies this obligation to the states. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
While Idaho law has moved away from automatically awarding a condemnee fees and
costs, this is a far cry from ITD's argument that a condemnee's just compensation may be
reduced or even eliminated by awarding costs and fees back to the condemnor. There is simply
no support for such an argument, in Idaho or elsewhere, and none of ITD's cases demonstrate
otherwise.
ITD's argument that Idaho Code § 7-718 allows for costs and fees to a condemnor, is
juxtaposed against this Court's repeated pronouncements that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the
"exclusive basis" for fees in actions involving state entities and presents a potential conflict
between the statutes. When confronted with a statutory construction or interpretation question, it
is incumbent upon the court to ascertain the legislative intent and to examine the public policy
and legislative history in order to ascertain the meaning of the provisions in question. State v.
Locke, 149 Idaho 641,642,239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct.App. 2010)

The Idaho Legislature codified the rules pertaining to condemnation actions. Idaho Code

§ 7-711A requires a condemnor to provide an advice of rights form to landowners prior to
beginning negotiations.

Idaho Code § 7-711A requires the form disclosure to include the

following mandatory language when advising landowners of their rights:
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(8) The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time
during the acquisition process. In cases where the condemning
authority condemns the property and the owner is able to establish
that just compensation exceeds the last amount timely offered by
the condemning authority by ten percent ( 10%) or more, the
condemning authority may be required to pay the owner's
reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the
determination whether costs and fees will be allowed. * 15
Idaho Code§ 7-711A (emphasis added). This mandatory disclosure became law on July 1, 2000
and its language has not changed since adoption. ITD utilizes the same language in its Advice of
Rights Form. See, Appendix A.
Of import here is that this mandatory disclosure does not inform a landowner that if they
fail to beat the condemning authority's last offer then they could be liable for the condemnor's
costs and attorney fees. Instead, the advice of rights form only speaks to an award of costs and
fees to the landowner. This distinction is crucial when considering the reasoning behind the
required disclosure in the first place.
The Statement of Purpose for Senate Bill No. 1515 provided that:
Idaho citizens may not be aware of their legal rights when there is
a potential taking of their property by eminent domain. This statute
is intended to provide notice to the property owners of their
individual rights in explainirig the condemnation process. This bill
is intended to give full and fair notice to the property owner of
what their rights are at the beginning of any condemnation process
as provided for under the laws of the state of Idaho.
Senate Bill No. 1515, as amended, as amended, Statement of Purpose.

See, Appendix A.

Although this legislative enactment was made 27 years after the Acarrequi decision, it was

15

* This is a codification to give notice to property owners of the Acarrequi rule.
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intended to fully and fairlv apprise landowners of their rights in condemnation proceedings.
However, absolutely nothing in the disclosure provides any indication to a condemnee that they
could be liable for the condernnor's fees and costs as ITD claims. The Legislature is presumed
to know the law when it enacts legislation and the absence of any notice to the landowner in this
required advice of rights form shows that a condemnee cannot be held responsible for a
condemnor's fees or costs if it fails to "beat" the condemnor's offer. If the law in Idaho, as
interpreted through Acarrequi were otherwise

why is there no disclosure of this potential

exorbitant liability in the advice of rights form? The answer is simple: Idaho law does not allow
for fees and costs to be imposed on the condemnee.
The legislative history of this provision shows that Idaho's law makers were very aware
of abuses and misrepresentations made by agents of the condemning authorities. The sponsor of
Senate Bill No. 1515, Senator Grant Ipsen, also introduced a related Senate Bill (No. 1429). In
that parallel Bill, the Statement of Purpose provided:
Idaho citizens are not being made aware of their legal rights when
they are faced with the taking of their property by eminent domain.
Government right of way agents or negotiators tell the owners that
they are not entitled to compensation for various items which the
law of Idaho does not provide compensation for, they tell the
owners that if they do not sell willingly, they could be held
responsible for the government's costs and attorneys fees, and they
refuse to provide owners with a copy of the appraisal report upon
which the government's offer is based. There is currently no
remedy for this conduct on the part of the government and no
protection for citizens, even when the conduct rises to the level of
bad faith. In some cases the representations of the right of way
agents or negotiators clearly constitute unauthorized practice of
law which has gone unregulated.
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This bill is designed to ensure that Idaho citizen faced with
condemnation are made aware of their rights under existing State
law. The bill does not create any new rights and will not cost Idaho
taxpayers any additional money. The effect would be to protect
citizens from unscrupulous strong-arm negotiation tactics as well
as innocent misrepresentations made by misinformed right of way
agents. Citizens cannot exercise rights they are not aware they
have; it is only fair that when the government is taking their private
property they are advised of the constitutional protections and
limitations they are entitled to under our system of laws.
Senate Bill No. 1429, Statement of Purpose. See, Appendix A. These concerns were considered
by the Idaho Legislature in enacting Idaho Code§ 7-711A, and demonstrate an intent to codify
and disclose the landowners rights, including Acarrequi 's treatment of fees and costs to the
condemnee. The misrepresentations of right-of-way agents telling landowners that they could be
found liable for fees and costs was an abusive tactic considered in enacting Section 7-71 lA. If
there were any support for ITD's present position, then clearly the Legislature would have
provided for a disclosure to property 0\\1Ilers of the potential liability. However, the Legislature
did not, and the advice of rights form remains the same today.

Its purpose is to advise

landowners of protections and limitations at the outset of condemnation negotiations.
Because Idaho law does not support an award of attorney's fees to a condemnor under

Acarrequi or its progeny, ITD's argument is frivolous and unsupported. The Trial Court exercised
its discretion in denying ITD attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 and ITD' s cross-appeal
should be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Grathol respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. Grathol requests costs on appeal pursuant to
I.A.R40(a).
Respectfully submitted this 23 rd day ofJuly, 2013.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Appellants
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I

PROPERTY OWNER
ADVICE OF RIGHTS FORM
In accordance with Idaho Code 7~711A, 7s711, and 54-4105(5}
(1) The Stale of Idaho,, ldaho Transportation Oepartrnent, by and through, the
Idaho Transportation Bo~rd, (Stelle) has the power under the constitution and the
laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to fake private property for public
use. This power is generally referred to as the power of "eminent domain" or
condemnation. The power can only be exercised when:
a} The property is needed for a public use authorized by Idaho law;
b) The laking of the property is necessary to such t1se;
c) The taking must'be located in the manner which will be most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(2) The State must negotiate With the property owner ih good faith to purchase
the property sought to· be taken and/or to settle with the owner for any other
damages which might result to the remainder of the QVv'her's property.
(3) Th.e owner of private property to be acquired by the State is entitled to be paid
for any diminution. in the value of the ovVne.r's remaining property which is caused
by the, taking and the use. of the property taken proposed by the condemning
authority. This· compensation, called "severance damages," is genetally
mea$U[ed by compa,ring the value of the property before the taking and the value
of the property after the taking. Damages are assessed according to Idaho
Code.
(4) The value of the property to be taken is
highest and besf use of the property.

to be determined based upon the

(5) If the negotiations to purchase the property and settle damages are
unsuccessful, the property oWner is entitled to assessment of damages from a
coµrt, jury or referee as provided by Idaho law.

(6) The owner has the right to consult With .ah appraiser of the owners choosing

at any time during the actjuisifion process at the owner's cost and expense.
(7) Th~ State shall delivet to the owner, upon 'request,. a copy oJ all apprais~I
reports' ooncething the owner's property preparEld by th~ State., Once a compJailit
for condf3TT1natio!"I is filed, the Idaho rules of civil procedure control the disclosure

of appraisals,

(£1:) In some cases authorized by Idaho Code a: value estimate can be substituted
for an appraisal. A value estimate is an accepted an¢! leg9 Uy approved tnethoct
to valu~ prop$tly when the cqn)Pensati:dn fot the requiremenf ,is ~10,000 or les.s'.
Ali value esthnates are 'i'eViewed and' approved by an ,Idaho, certified general n:ral
estate appraiser. A valt1e e::..titnate ,.must be proyicfed to an owner, .If an owner
dQ~S 11qt accep\'ct Value estirnate, he is entitled to ah apprai$al by an agent of the
,,Idaho Transportation Department ~eque.sts for an appraisal lieu of a value
Elsthnat~ shoukf b~ $Ubmifted to the Jdaho Ttalispdrti':ttiori Deparlmeht Within 3{?
d~ys of receipt of this· notice and sent to: ldaho Transpprtqtjqn Oepartmfmt, Right
ofWay SectioJl; Attn: Apprais,al Coordinator, P.O, Bax 7129. Boise,ldaho'83707.

in

(9) The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time, during the
acquisition process, In cases in which the State condemns property and the
owner is able to establish that just compensation exceeds the last amount timely
offered by the State by ten percent{10%) or more, the condemning, authority may
be required to pay the owner's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court
will make the determination whether costs and fees wilt be awarded.
(10) The form contemplated by this section shall be deemed delivered by United
State;; certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the person or persons shown
in the official records of the county assessor as the owner of the property. A
second copy will be attached to the appraisal at the time it is delivered to the

owner:
(11) If the State desires to acquire property pursuant to this chapter, the State or
any of its agents or employees shall not give lhe owner any timing deadline as to
when the owner must respond to the initial offer which is less than thirty (30)
days. A violation of the provisions of this subsection shall render any action
pursuant to this chapter nuH a'nd void.
(12) Nothing in this section changes
section T-711; Idaho Code.

the assessment of damages set forth ln

(13) If a business has been in existence for five years or more and is owned by a
party whose lands are being condemned and the business is located on those
l,rnds. ot upon adjoining land$ owned or held by the same party, then the owner
of the' bustness may be entitled to damages to fhe business, (A tenant, b:Usiness
owner does not qualify.) A business owner has the right to consult with an
attorney,
The business owner has the burden of making a claim by sending it certified mail
return receipt requested to the Idaho TransportaUon Department, Legat Section,
P.O. Box 7129_, Boise, Idaho 83703 no later than 90 days after service of the
summons and complaint for condemnation on the property owner. The business
damages claim must be clearly segregated from a claim for property damages
and cannot duplicate damages paid for land or for severance' damages. The
business owner, a CPA, or a business damage expert, must prepare the daim.
The claim must include an explanation of the nature, extent and monetary
amquntof damages and be supported by copies of federal and state income tax
returns, state sales tax returns, balance sheets, profit and loss statements and
any other records relied upon for five preceding years:,
No business damages wm be awarded if the loss. can tet;isonably be prevented
by a rejocation of the business or by taking steps that" a, reasonably, prudent
person wottl~:f take.1 No pµsin~ss -~~ages will b~, p~id for ternpo@ry-' Qijsin~s,s

interwptton due to construction.

·
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IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1515, As Amended, As Amended
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE
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AN ACT
RELATING TO EMINENT DOV,AIN; ~-MENDING CHAPTER 7, TITLE 7, IDAHO CODE,
BY THE
ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 7-711A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE REQUIRED DUTIES
OF A STATE OR LOCAL UNIT OF GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY THAT IS BEGINNING
NEGOTIATIONS TO ACQUIRE A PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY IN FEE SIMPLE UNDER THE
STATE'S EMINENT DOMAIN LAW, TO PROVIDE A FORM TO ADVISE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY
OWNERS, TO PRODUCE A METHOD OF DELIVERY OF SUCH FORMS AND TO PROVIDE
APPLICATION.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

1
2

3
4
5
6
7

10
11
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13
14
15
16
17
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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37

38
39
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43

SECTION 1. That Chapter 7, Title 7, Idaho Code, be, and the same hereby
amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and designated
as Section 7-711A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows:
7-711A. ADVICE OF RIGHTS FORM
RIGHTS WHEN CONDEMNING AUTHORITY
ACQUIRES PROPERTY. Whenever a state or local unit of government or a public
utility is beginning negotiations to acquire a parcel of real property in fee
simple, the condemning authority shall provide the owner of the property a
form containing a summary of the rights of an owner of property to be acquired
under this chapter. If the condemning authority does not supply the owner of
the real property with this form, there will be a presumption that any sale or
contract entered into between the condemning authority and the owner .was not
voluntary and the condeITu.~ing authority may be held responsible for such
relief, if any, as the court may determine to be appropriate considering all
of the facts and circumstances. The form shall contain substantially the following:
(1)
The (name of entity allowed to use eminent domain proceedings pursuant to chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code) has the power under the constitution
and the laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to take private property for public use. This power is generally referred to as the power of
"eminent domain" or condemnation. The power can only be exercised when:
(a)
The property is needed for a public use authorized by Idaho law;
(b)
The taking of the property is necessary to such use;
(c)
The taking must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(2)
The condemning authority must negotiate with the property owner in
good faith to purchase the property sought to be taken and/or to settle with
the owner for any other damages which might result to the remainder of the
owner's property.
(3)
The owner of private property to be acquired by the condemning
authority is entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of the
owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking and the use of the
property taken proposed by the condemning authority. This compensation, called
"severance damages," is generally measured by comparing the value of the property before the taking and the value of the property after the taking.
Dam2

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ages are assessed according to Idaho Code.
(4)
The value of the property to be taken is to be determined based upon
the highest and best use of the property.
(5)
If the negotiations to purchase the property and settle damages are
unsuccessful,
the property owner is entitled to assessment of damages from a
court, jury or referee as provided by Idaho law.
(6)
The owner has the right to consult with an appraiser of the owner's
choosing at any time during the acquisition process at the owner's cost and
expense.
(7)
The condemning authority shall deliver to the owner, upon request,
a
copy of all appraisal reports concerning the owner's property prepared by the
condemning authority. Once a complaint for condemnation is filed,
the Idaho
rules of civil procedure control the disclosure of appraisals.
(8)
The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time during the acquisition process.
In cases in which the condemning authority
condemns property and the owner is able to establish that just compensation
exceeds the last amount timely offered by the condemning authority by ten percent (10%) or more, the condemning authority may be required to pay the
owner's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the determination whether costs and fees will be awarded.
(9)
The form contemplated by this section shall be deemed delivered by
United States certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the person or persons shown in the official records of the county assessor as the owner of the
property. A second copy will be attached to the appraisal at the time it is
delivered to the owner.
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26
27
28

(10) If a condemning authority desires to acquire property pursuant to
this chapter, the condemning authority or any of its agents or ewployees shall
not give the owner any timing deadline as to when the owner must respond to
the initial offer which is less than thirty (30) days. A violation of the provisions of this subsection shall render any action pursuant to this chapter
null and void.
(11) Nothing in this section changes the assessment of damages set forth
in section 7-711, Idaho Code.

29
30
31
32
33

Amendment
AS1515
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
11 I I
Second Regular Session - 2000

1111

Fifty-fifth Legislature

Moved by

Wheeler

Seconded by Hawkins
IN THE SENATE
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1515

1

2
3
4
5

AMENDMENT TO SECTION l
On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 14,
following

"property"

insert:

"in fee simple".

CORRECTION TO TITLE
On page 1, in line 5, following "PROPERTY" insert: "IN FEE SIMPLE".
Ipsen
Moved by
Seconded by Frasure

IN THE SENATE
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1515, As Amended
6
7
8

9
10

AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1
On page 1 of the engrossed bill, in line 39, delete "also".
On

page

2, in line 19, following "owner's" insert: '{reasonable"; in line

21, following nbe" insert: "deemed"; and in line 28, delete "an"
"the initial".

and

insert:

Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Impact
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 10185
Idaho citizens may not be aware of their legal rights when there is a
potential taking of their property by eminent domain. This statute is intended tc
provide notice to the property owners of their individual rights in explaining the
condemnation process. This bill is intended to give full and fair notice to the
property owner of what their rights are at the beginning of any condemnation
process as provided for under the laws of the state of Idaho

FISCAL IMPACT
The only fiscal impact would be the printing of the notices.

Contact
Name: Senator Grant Ipsen
Phone: (208) 332-1326

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE
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SENATE BILL NO. 1429
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE

8

Jl..N ACT
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING CHAPTER 7, TITLE 7, IDAHO CODE, BY THE
Jl..DDITION OF A NEW SECTION 7-711A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE REQUIRED DUTIES
OF A STATE OR LOCAL UNIT OF GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY THAT IS BEGINNING
NEGOTIATIONS TO ACQUIRE A PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY, TO PROVIDE PRESUMPTIONS,
TO PROVIDE FORMS, TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES, TO PROVIDE RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF
PROPERTY AN::l TO PROVIDE FOR PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH IN NEGOTIATIONS AND TO PROVIDE THE EFFECT ON DAMAGES.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

10
11

12
i3
14

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
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24
25
26
27

28
29
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34
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SECTION 1. That Chapter 7, Title 7, Idaho Code, be, and the same is
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and designated as Section 7-711A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows:
7-71IA. ADV1CE OF RIGHTS FORM -- RIGHTS WHEN GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY
WANTS PROPERTY. Whenever a state or local unit of government or a public utility is beginning negotiations to acquire a piece of real property, the entity,
government or public utility shall provide the owner of the property a form
containing the following information. If the government or public utility does
not supply the owner of the real property with this form, there will be a presumption that any sale or contract entered into between the government or
utility and the owner was not voluntary and the government or utility may be
held responsible for such relief, if any, as the court may determine to be
appropriate considering all of the facts and circumstances. The form shall
contain substantially the following:
(1) The (name of entity allowed to use eminent domain proceedings pursuant to chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code) has the power under the constitution
and laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to take private property
for public use. This power is generally referred to as the power of "eminent
domain" or condemnation. The power can only be exercised when:
{a) The property is needed for a public use pursuant to section 7-701,
Idaho Code;
(b) The taking of the property is necessary;
(c) The taking will cause the greatest public good and the least private
injury;

(d) The government or public utility has negotiated with the property
owner in good faith in an attempt to acquire the property through voluntary sale and purchase; and
(e) "Just compensation• for the taking has been ascertained and paid pursuant to section 7-711, Idaho Code.
12)
The owner of private property to be acquired by the government or
public utility is entitled to be paid for the property and property rights
which are taken. The government or public utility must pay the fair market
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value of the pro?e::ty and prcperty rights. The government or public ut-ility
will not be required to pay more than any other fully knowledge.able buyer in

1
2
3

the open market and ~ill not be allowed to pay less than any other
knowledgeable buyer in the open market.
(3) The value of the property to be taken is to be detennined based on

5
6
7

the highest and best use of the propertyr which may differ from its current
use. For example,
if property is zoned for commercial use but is currently
used for agricultural purposes, the value of the land to be taken may be based
on commercial use rather than agricultural.

2

8
9
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11
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(4)

The owner of the property to be acquired by the government or a

pub-

lie utility is also entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of the
owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking and the use of the
property taken proposed by the government or public utility.
This compensation, called nseverance damages," is generally measured by comparing the value

of the property before the taking and the value of the property after the taking. Damages are assessed according to section 7-711, Idaho Code.
(5}
The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time during the acquisition process. In cases in which the government or a public

utility condemns property and the owner is able to establish that just compensation exceeds the last amount timely offered by the government or public
utility by ten percent (10%) or more, the government or public utility may be
required to pay the owner's costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the
determination whether costs and fees will be awarded or not.
(6} The owner has the right to consult with an appraiser of his or her

own choosing at any time during the acquisition process

at

his

or

her

own

expense.

(7)

The

owner

has

the right to obtain a copy of all appraisal reports,

prepared by the acquiring agency's

(8)

or the

utility's appraiser upon request.

The owner is generally not responsible for the legal fees of the gov-

ernment or public utility if a lawsuit is filed to acquire
eminent domain.

the

property

via
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(9) If the owner and the government or utility cannot agree as to the
amount of just compensation due for the property, the owner has the right to

32

have the issue determined either by the court or a jury.

33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40
~1

42
43

(10) If

a

government

or utility desires to acquire property pursuant to

this chapter, the government or utility or any of its agents or employees
shall not give the owner any timing deadline as to when the owner must respond

to an offer which is less than sixty (60) days. A violation of the provisions
of this subsection shall render any action pursuant to tr~s chapter null and
void.

(11) Failure by the government or·utility to give the owner of the property the form required by this section shall be prima facie evidence of bad
faith in negotiations.
(12) Nothing in this section changes the assessment of damages set forth

in section 7-711, Idaho Code.

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact
ST.RTEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS09926
Idaho citizens are not being made aware of their legal rights when they are faced
with the taking of their property be eminent domain. Government right of way agents or
negotiators tell the owners that they are not entitled to compensation for various items
which the law of Idaho does not provide compensation for, they tell the owners that if
they do not sell willingly, they could be held responsible for the government's costs and
attorneys fees, and they refuse to provide owners with a copy of the appraisal report upon
which the government's offer is based. There is currently no remedy for this conduct on
the part of the government and no protection for citizens, even when the conduct rises to
the level of bad faith.
In some cases the representations of the right of way agents or
negotiators clearly constitute unauthorized practice of law which has gone unregulated.
This bill is designed to ensure that Idaho citizens faced with condemnation are
made aware of their rights under existing State law. The bill does not create any new
rights and will not cost Idaho taxpayers any additional money
The effect would be to
protect citizens from unscrupulous strong-arm negotiation tactics as well as innocent

misrepresentations made by misinformed right of way agents.
Citizens cannot
exercise rights they are not aware they have; it is only fair that when the government is
taking their private property they are advised of the constitutional protections and
limitations they are entitled to under our system of laws.
FISCAL IMPACT
The only fiscal impact would be the printing of the notices.
Contact
Name: Senator Grant Ipsen
Phone: (208) 332-1327
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